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Support for Repatriation Policies of Migrants
Comparisons Across and Explanations for European Countries

Marcel Coenders and Marcel Lubbers
Utrecht University, The Netherlands

Peer Scheepers
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Abstract
In this article we focus on the acceptance of migrants among the general public in the receiving societies. We analyze the most radical of such anti-immigrant sentiments, that is, the support for repatriation policies for legally established immigrants. We analyze intra- and international differences among Western and Eastern European societies, taking advantage of recently collected cross-national high quality data providing means to rigorously test hypotheses on individual and contextual level determinants. Although there are large differences between countries within European regions, we found that support for repatriation policies is overall somewhat higher in Western European societies. In line with Ethnic Group Conflict Theory, support for repatriation policies is stronger in countries with higher proportions of resident migrants and higher levels of immigration. Regarding individual level determinants, we found that particularly lower educated individuals are more in favor of repatriation of migrants. The effect of education differs however across countries and is – in line with socialization theories – less strong in Eastern European countries.

Key words: cross-national comparisons • Europe • exclusionism • support migration policies

INTRODUCTION AND QUESTIONS

Post-Second World War Europe has known different waves of immigrants seeking economic or social benefits or escaping from persecution, (interethnic) violence or wars in their home countries (Castles and Miller, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998). By the beginning of the 1950s, the process of de-colonization started, bringing many colonial minorities to Europe: North Africans and Southeast Asians came

to France; Indians, Pakistanis and West Indians went to the UK; South Moluccans and thereafter Surinamers migrated to the Netherlands. From the early 1960s on, many European countries, but particularly countries in the Northwest of Europe (e.g. former West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden) started recruiting so-called guest workers, some from the Mediterranean countries, but many more from North Africa and Turkey. This recruitment process lasted as long as the economic boom, until the early 1970s when economic stagnation was caused by rising oil prices.

By the mid-1970s, processes of family reunions had started, bringing foremost women and children of these former guest workers who meanwhile had decided not to return to their home countries, as initially had been the intention of European governments. Over these decades, migrants built quite a demographic stock in many of these relatively wealthy countries (e.g. Sweden, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, former West Germany and France) such as can be ascertained in the Appendix 2. Migrants stocks turn out to be much lower in most Mediterranean (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) and many Eastern European countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), except for former Soviet countries (e.g. Estonia and Latvia) that host many Russians as a relict from their communist regime history. Many of the Eastern European societies are more heterogeneous ethnically than migrant statistics would suggest, due to societal changes before the Second World War. The Hungarian population in Romania and the Turkish population in Bulgaria are estimated up to 7 percent and 10 percent of the population respectively (CIA, 2007). Moreover, the gypsy population in the Eastern European states is not included in migration statistics. Estimations and official statistics vary largely. Slovakia is estimated to have relatively the largest gypsy population with 9.7 percent (Tanner, 2004, 2005).

The mid-1980s saw dramatic increases in the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, worldwide, peaking after the end of the Cold War in 1993 (estimated at 18.2 million people, according to Castles and Miller, 2003) and thereafter slowly declining (to 12.1 million). The majority of these refugees remained located in the poorest countries nearby their home country, and hence only a small proportion of the total number of asylum seekers make it to the highly developed countries. In Western European countries they attracted lots of public and political attention, particularly in the early and mid-1990s. In several countries, extreme right-wing parties had electoral successes, fuelled by the relative presence of non-EU citizens in their countries as well as by anti-immigrant attitudes and dissatisfaction with democracy (Lubbers et al., 2002). Many European countries reacted with series of migration restrictions thereby building 'Fortress Europe' to the effect that net migration had become rather low in the late 1990s (Appendix 2). By the turn of the century also the number of refugee applications fell to rather low rates for so many European countries (except for Sweden, Ireland and Austria, amongst others; see the Appendix), which might well be due to continued restrictive immigration policies (Castles and Miller, 2003).

Resistance to these migrants has been high on the public agenda in many Western European countries over the last few decades (e.g. Coenders et al., 2005; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Pettigrew, 1998; Quillian, 1995). Semyonov et al. (2006) showed, based on a repeated cross-national study, that in many countries there has been a substantial increase in this resistance to migrants in the period between 1988 and 1994, that is, the period in which the number of asylum seekers increased, which thereafter levelled off. Less attention has been paid to the resistance to migrants in East European countries (exceptions include Evans and Need, 2002, based on data from 1993–6; Kunovich, 2004, based on data from 1995), certainly not in comparison to (older) EU member countries. Yet, in a recent overview on racist extremism in Central and East European countries, Mudde (2005) supposed that 'anti-immigrant sentiments are increasing in CEE countries equalling if not overtaking the situation in the West' (p. 181), as yet without firm and up-dated cross-national empirical evidence. That is why we set out to test whether and to what extent these CEE countries differ from other EU member countries. We will argue that these anti-immigrant sentiments may be due to national and individual characteristics such as the ones that have been shown to explain anti-immigrant sentiments in Western European countries (Coenders et al., 2005; Semyonov et al., 2006). This provides us with the opportunity to test theories from which these hypotheses on national characteristics have been derived more thoroughly.

In previous research, many aspects of anti-immigrant sentiments have been focused on the overarching label of ethnic exclusionism (see Coenders et al., 2005, 2007). In this article, we will focus on some of these aspects for which more recent, valid and reliable cross-national data that have become available for West as well as for East European countries. More particularly, we will focus on the most radical of anti-immigrant sentiments, that is, support for repatriation policies concerning legal migrants, actually indicating that people wish to refrain from any contact, and moreover from any mixture with, migrants even if they are already legally admitted to their country. This issue is of particular relevance. Many of these legally administered migrants are entitled to stay in the country and have been granted a number of civil rights, at least formally speaking. However, ordinary people do not discuss civil rights for migrants in formal terms. Support for repatriation policies implies social exclusion of migrants, which in turn implies social non-integration that may induce interethnic tensions. This issue has become widely disseminated throughout the public and political arenas (Lubbers et al., 2002).

Then, the questions to be addressed are: a) to what extent do Eastern European countries differ from Western European countries regarding support for repatriation policies for legal migrants?; b) to what extent can we explain such cross-national differences, considering cross-national demographic or economic conditions, taking into account individual differences that have been shown to be relevant for support for repatriation policies for legal migrants?

THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

We first set out to explicate theories and hypotheses on explanations on the contextual level to explain cross-national differences we expect to find; and second, to explicate hypotheses derived from these theories to explain differences at the individual level.

Cross-national Differences

Realistic Conflict Theory explicates the societal conditions under which ethnic conflicts arise. One of the early theorists from this tradition – Coser (1956) – claimed that competition over scarce resources (material resources, power and status) between social groups, such as ethnic groups, is the catalyst of antagonistic intergroup attitudes. The dominant group has a sense of claims on these scarce resources over subordinate groups (Blumer, 1958). When other groups claim these resources as well, or when the resources get scarcer, competition increases. Blalock used the concept of 'actual competition' to refer to such macro-level socio-economic conditions. Next to the macro-level competition, Blalock referred to micro-level competition. Individuals from different ethnic groups that hold similar social positions would compete over resources, for example, work in similar niches of the labor market, as elaborated by Olzak (1992). This actual competition would also be perceived as such, and in turn is expected to induce unfavorable attitudes towards out-groups (Blalock, 1967).

A core assumption in conflict theory, explicated by Bobo (1988, 1999), is that dominant group members distinguish themselves affectively as a group from other subordinate out-groups. Specific presumed group traits set the boundaries between the in-group and out-groups. Social Identity Theory substantiates this proposition (Brown, 1995; Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). According to the results of the experiments of Tajfel and Turner, individuals have the fundamental need to achieve a positive social identity which induces them to perceive their in-group as superior to (ethnic) out-groups. Consequently, favorable characteristics that they perceive among members of the in-group are applied to themselves (social identification) and negative characteristics are attributed to out-groups (social contra-identification). Our proposition then is that social identification and social contra-identification will intensify under the competitive conditions on which Realistic Conflict Theories focuses. The core proposition – deduced from Ethnic Group Conflict Theory, a synthesis between Social Identity Theory and Realistic Conflict Theory – is: intergroup competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, eventually resulting in ethnic exclusionism.

At the contextual (macro-) level, we can derive from Ethnic Group Conflict Theory the expectation that ethnic exclusionism varies with the level of actual competition within countries. We will rigorously test this assumption by studying countries that may be quite different in terms of contextual conditions indicating

competition both historically and contemporarily, such as East European countries. We propose that the varying levels of actual competition may be related to conditions where there are a) increasing numbers of people competing for, *ceteris paribus*, approximately the same amount of scarce resources or b) stable numbers of people competing for a decreasing amount of scarce resources. These conditions all imply a stronger competition for scarce resources between the dominant group and ethnic out-groups. Following this rationale (also suggested by Fossett and Kieholt, 1989; Kunovich, 2004; Levine and Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002), we propose that support for repatriation policies for legal migrants will be stronger in countries with the contextual conditions of:

Hypothesis 1a: a relatively high proportion of resident migrants

1b: a relatively high level of immigration

1c: a relatively high number of asylum seekers, and

1d: a high unemployment level.

The gross domestic product of a country is expected to indicate the availability of resources. Therefore we also expect that the higher the GDP, the lower the support for repatriation policies for legal migrants.

Individual Level Differences

Next to differences between countries, we also formulate hypotheses on the micro-level on the support for repatriation policies for legal migrants, again derived from Ethnic Group Conflict Theory. The level of ethnic competition will not only vary between nations, but can be expected to vary between social categories as well. Social categories that are within the vicinity of ethnic minorities or hold similar social positions, are more likely to be in direct competition with ethnic minorities than social categories who do not deal with ethnic minorities in their daily lives (Fetzer, 2000; Hood and Morris, 1997; Simon and Alexander, 1993). Consequently, these social categories are more likely to respond with antagonistic attitudes, favoring policies to repatriate migrants. An overview of the social-structural position of minorities in many European countries shows that they are overrepresented in the lower strata of society – even though there is reasonable variation between the European countries (Kiehl and Werner, 1999). Moreover, minority members are also very often concentrated in urban areas. In general, we expect that lower strata members of the majority group who hold social positions comparable to those of ethnic minorities will have to compete more with immigrants on the labor and housing market. As indicators of such lower strata positions we consider lower levels of education or lower income levels, working as manual laborer, being unemployed or living in urban areas. Consequently, we derive from Ethnic Group Conflict Theory that:

Hypothesis 2: support for repatriation policies for legal migrants will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as ethnic out-groups, more particularly among:

2a: people with a low level of education

2b: manual workers

2c: unemployed people

2d: people with low income, and

2e: people living in urban areas.

Alternatively to group conflict theory, Kunovich (2004) proposed that under certain conditions the differences between lower and higher social strata in their exclusionist reactions may dampen. Kunovich expected that this would be the case in particular in countries that suffer from major collective threats (e.g. poor economic conditions, like unemployment). His arguments were particularly based on the large societal differences between East and West European countries, and are threefold. First, disadvantaged groups may react with despair rather than hostility toward minorities. Second, disadvantaged groups may perceive their situation to be less severe than for minorities. Third, Kunovich poses a solidarity hypothesis, stating that disadvantaged majority groups may consider some kind of solidarity with – disadvantaged – minority groups. However, there may be another reason why differences on resistance to minorities between particularly lowly and highly educated people may be small in East European countries, that is, differences between the educational systems of the East and West (Meier, 1989). In the former communist states, a considerable degree of standardization had to provide as much equality in opportunities. In this centralized educational system the social order was reproduced. The expectation is that due to this kind of educational system, differences between lower and higher educated people will dampen in Eastern European countries. In addition, the educational system is the main social institution for the transmission of the 'official political culture'. Selznick and Steinberg (1969; Vogt, 1997) argued that the values that are transmitted in the educational system reflect the official culture of a country, which in turn is determined by the regime form. In liberal democratic regimes, the educational system would promulgate democratic values and ideals, which are at odds with intolerance. Weil (1985) therefore suggested that the educational effect is smaller in countries with non-democratic regimes or in recently established democracies. Previously, Coenders and Scheepers (2003) indeed showed with cross-national data from 1995, that the educational effect on aspects of ethnic exclusionism was less strong in recent democracies, among which foremost East European countries, as compared to educational effects in long-standing democracies. The arguments given above lead us to expect that:

Hypothesis 3a: the educational effect is less strong in Eastern European countries than in Western European countries, and

3b: the educational effect is less strong in countries with high levels of unemployment.

DATA

The standard Eurobarometer 59.2 was collected in May and June 2003, carried out by the European Opinion Research Group, on request of the European Commission, Directorate – General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Unit. We used samples in 17 areas in 15 countries. Separate samples were drawn for Northern Ireland and for East and West Germany, hence we analysed these separately in our (multilevel) analyses. Each target sample was 1000 interviews, except for Northern Ireland (300) and Luxembourg (600). Regarding the sampling method, the European Opinion Research Group (2003) states that:

> Standard Eurobarometer surveys cover the population of the respective nationalities of the 15 European Union member states in 2003, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the member states. The basic sample design applied in all member states is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points is drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.
>
> For doing so, points are drawn systematically from each of the 'administrative regional units', after stratification by individual unit and type of area. Hence, they represent the whole territory of member states according to EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of resident population of the respective EU nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address is drawn at random. Further addresses are selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, a respondent is drawn at random. All interviews are face-to-face in the respondent's home and in the appropriate national language.

The fieldwork control report from the Standard Eurobarometer shows that the response rate varies from a low 27 percent in Great Britain to a rather high 88 percent in France.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.2 was collected in May 2003, carried out by the Gallup Organization Hungary, on request of the European Commission, Directorate – General Press and Communication and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). It covers citizens of each of the 13 countries that in 2003 were applying for European Union membership. Of them, 10 became members in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania became members in 2007, leaving Turkey the only non-EU member state in our sample. We will refer to the countries in the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer data as the East European countries. Each target sample was 1000 interviews, except for Cyprus and Malta, for which the target was 500 interviews. The basic sample design applied is a multi-stage, random probability one. All interviews

are face-to-face in the respondent's home and in the appropriate national language. In countries with significant minorities the respondents had a chance to respond in their mother tongue (in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Russian and in Romania in Hungarian). The fieldwork control report shows that the response rate varies from 41.4 percent in Estonia to 64.4 percent in Latvia. We decided to select only those respondents with the nationality of the respective country which of course differed strongly between countries.

MEASUREMENTS

Dependent Variables at the Individual Level

The Eurobarometer in the Eastern European countries contained the same questions as the Standard Eurobarometer of Western European countries; the question formulations are identical. The items referring to repatriation of migrants were phrased as: 'legally established immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin if they are unemployed' and 'legally established immigrants should all be sent back to their country of origin'. These items were analysed together with other items on legally established immigrants from which they were shown to be distinct in terms of factorial dimensions (Coenders et al., 2005, 2007). We tested whether these items can be regarded as measurement instruments that are cross-nationally comparable. To answer the question whether measurement instruments are equivalent across East European countries *and* West European countries in 2003, we applied multi-sample analyses upon all 30 samples of the Standard Eurobarometer 59.2 (17 samples in 15 countries, including separate samples of Northern Ireland and Eastern Germany) and the 2003 candidate countries Eurobarometer data (13 national samples). We concluded that many aspects of ethnic exclusionism were equivalently measured in all countries by the same items, which also holds for the measurements on repatriation policies. Appendix 1 provides an overview of mean scores and percentages of those who favor repatriation policies for legal migrants.

Independent Variables at the Individual Level

To measure the first of our independent variables, *educational attainment*, we used information on the age at which respondents had stopped their full-time education. We regarded educational attainment as an interval variable. In order to assign a numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time of survey, we took their age. Furthermore, to prevent extreme high scores on the educational attainment variable, we regarded the age of 30 as an upper limit.

A measure of *social class* was constructed, using the available information in these secondary data, to resemble the cross-national comparable categorization (Erikson et al., 1983) adopted by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). We distinguished a number of categories, based on their actual social position in the labor force: the higher professionals (including professionals, business proprietors and

top management); the lower professionals (middle management); routine non-manuals workers (people with an employed position at a desk, in service jobs or travelling); self-employed people (farmers, fishermen and shop owners); supervisors and skilled manual workers; and a category of other (unskilled) manual workers and servants. To these classes we added as distinct categories the people who were momentarily not active in the labor force: people working in their own household; students; unemployed people; and lastly, retired people and disabled people.

In the East European countries, no country-specific income questions were available. Instead, only a harmonized income variable was available that measures the gross monthly household income in ten deciles. This harmonized income variable is comparable across countries. Missing data for household income were – for each country separately – imputed by an estimated value based on other information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing income values by means of a regression analysis of household income on seven variables that are related to household income. *Urbanization* was measured by means of three categories ranging from 'a rural area or village' or 'a small or middle-sized town' to 'a large town', as judged by the respondent. Gender and age were considered to be control variables in the equation.

Independent Variables at the National Level

Since Eurostat figures regarding the percentage of non-nationals were only available for a selection of Eastern European countries, we had to find another indicator for the East European countries. As an alternative indicator, we applied the size of the *migrant stock* as a percentage of the total population, as registered by the United Nations Population Division (2002). These figures refer to mid-year 2000. The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) defines the migrant stock as the number of people who are born outside the country. For a subset of countries that did not have data on place of birth but had data on citizenship, the estimated number of non-citizens is given. In both cases, the migrant stock also includes refugees, some of whom may not be foreign-born. For Slovakia and Bulgaria, the migrant stock was estimated by the UNPD applying a statistical model based on census data classified by place of birth or citizenship.

To take into account the effect of immigration, we took the average annual number of migrants and related it to the total population. For the East European countries only the net migration was available for all countries. From the United Nations Population Division (2002), we derived the *average annual net migration in the period 1995 to 2000, per 1000 capita.* The average annual net migration is the net average annual number of migrants during the period, that is, the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and non-citizens.

Next, we took the *average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 1000 capita* as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum

applications are quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers, such as the number of admitted refugees. It is much more complicated to produce comparable figures regarding the number of admitted refugees, due to cross-national differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g. provisional versus durable permits), as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general. The number of asylum applications in each country is registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2002, 2003). To take into account strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average number of asylum applications in the two years preceding the time of survey, that is in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of asylum applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total population as derived from Eurostat (2003d).

Figures on the *unemployment rate* in 2002 were taken from Eurostat (2003a) and they refer to the number of unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. The estimates of the number of unemployed are based on the results of the European Union Labor Force Survey. Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 years not living in collective households who were without work within the two weeks following the reference week and have actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks or who found a job to start within a period of at most three months. We applied unemployment data from the German national statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to derive the unemployment rate in (former) West and East Germany. The unemployment rate for Germany as a whole, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in West Germany and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). Likewise, the unemployment rate for the United Kingdom, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2002).

Figures on *Gross Domestic Product* were taken from Eurostat (2003b). GDP is measured per head in thousands of PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) at current prices, indexed at 100 for the 15 EU members, in the year 2002. Next, these relative figures were multiplied with the actual GDP per head in thousands for the EU (Eurostat, 2003c) to derive the actual GDP for each country. For Malta, Eurostat did not report GDP figures after 1999. To estimate Malta's GDP in 2002, we used GDP growth rates between 2000 and 2002 from the National Statistics Office Malta (2003). The German figure was adjusted for East Germany and West Germany by the GDP ratio for the regions as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). Similarly, the GDP for the United Kingdom was adjusted for the GDP ratio in Great Britain and Northern Ireland as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2003a), based on figures of 1999.

ANALYSES

First, we calculated the differences between East European countries and West European countries regarding support for repatriation policies. These are

presented in Appendix 1. Next, we performed multi-level analyses. We tested whether it would make sense to use this advanced analysis by estimating the difference in the loglikelihood between a model containing only an intercept (individual level variation) with a model containing estimates for random variation at the country level. This clearly provided us with evidence that there are major differences between countries in this respect. Next, we included stepwise individual characteristics and country characteristics to find out whether inclusion of these characteristics would improve the model fit which it turned out to do. Here, we also include the interaction effects. We present the results of these analyses in Table 1 to ascertain which national and individual characteristics actually affect support for repatriation policies.

FINDINGS

Let us first consider the cross-national differences in support for repatriation policies. These are presented in Appendix 1. On average, people living in West European countries support repatriation of migrants somewhat more (24%) than people living in East European countries (19%). We present the scores as means on the scale of support for repatriation policies in Figure 1.

When we first look at differences between West European countries, we find that in a number of countries, support for repatriation policies is clearly above the average scale score of 0.35. This holds for Great Britain, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, (former) West and East Germany, France, and the Mediterranean countries. In particular, in Greece, the average is higher. In some of these countries, the migrant stock is a bit higher than in many other EU countries. Among the East European countries this high position on support for repatriation policies is held by Latvia, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. A clearly lower level of support for repatriation policies is found in the Nordic countries: Finland, Sweden and Denmark. For the East European countries such a low level of support for repatriation policies is found in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as in Poland. The latter countries are characterized by a rather low level of migrant stock as well as by a negative net migration, possibly relevant for this low level of support for repatriation policies. To find out which of these national level characteristics is actually related to the level of support for repatriation policies, we will have to take a look at the results of the multi-level analyses.

Model 1 of Table 1 is the baseline model and shows that most of the variation is at the individual level. Model 2 contains the individual level variables as well as the interaction effect to test the differential effect of education in Western and Eastern European societies. The overall effect of educational attainment across all countries is -0.98^{-2} (parameter is not displayed in model 2), indicating that low educated people support these policies more than highly educated people hence supporting hypothesis 2a. We tested whether these educational differences would be less strong in Eastern European countries by means of a cross-level interaction. The main effect of educational attainment in model 2 is -1.18^{-2}.

Table 1 Parameter estimates from multi-level models on support for repatriation policies standard errors in brackets ($N = 24{,}946$)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	**0.35 (0.02)**	**0.33 (0.02)**	**0.35 (0.03)**
Individual characteristics			
Education		**−1.18^{-2} (0.13^{-2})**	**−1.19^{-2} (0.08^{-2})**
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Routine non-manuals		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Self-employed people		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Skilled manuals		**0.07 (0.01)**	**0.07 (0.01)**
Unskilled manuals		**0.07 (0.02)**	**0.07 (0.02)**
Housewives		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**
Students		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Unemployed people		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Retired people		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Income		**−2.65^{-2}**	**−2.64^{-2}**
		(0.78^{-2})	**(0.53^{-2})**
Age		**0.07^{-2}**	**0.07^{-2})**
		(0.02^{-2})	**(0.02^{-2}**
Gender: male (female = ref.)		*1.20^{-2}*	*1.20^{-2}*
		(*0.64^{-2}*)	(*0.64^{-2}*)
Urbanization: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle-sized town		−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
Large-sized town		**−0.03 (0.01)**	**−0.03 (0.01)**
Country characteristics			
Eastern Europe		−0.06^{-2}	−0.83^{-1}
		(3.45^{-2})	(0.58^{-1})
Unemployment: 2002			−0.39^{-2}
			(0.43^{-2})
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			−0.12^{-2}
			(0.05^{-1})
Migrant stock: 2000			**0.51^{-2}**
			(0.23^{-2})
Net migration: 1995–2000			**0.18^{-1}**
			(0.08^{-1})
Asylum applications: 2001–2			0.97^{-2}
			(1.89^{-2})
Interaction			
Education * Eastern Europe		**0.53^{-2}**	**0.56^{-2}**
		(0.22^{-2})	**(0.14^{-2})**
Education * Unemployment 2002			−0.01^{-2}
			(0.02^{-2})
Variance components			
Individual	0.15	0.14	0.14
(Percentage explained)		(2.73)	(2.73)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(22.03)	(38.17)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$; italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

Figure 1 Mean scores on repatriation policies for legal migrants in Western and Eastern countries



This is the effect of education in Western European countries. The interaction effect between educational level and the East European region is positively significant, indicating that the educational effect is less negative ($-1.18^{-2} + .53^{-2}$) in East European countries, just as we expected and specified in hypothesis 3a. This finding implies that differences between educational categories in terms of support for repatriation policies are smaller in Eastern European countries than in Western European countries. Regarding other individual level variables, we observed that many occupational categories favor repatriation policies more than higher professionals, except for lower professionals and students. Support for these policies is particularly high among unskilled and skilled manual workers (supporting hypothesis 2b), followed by housewives, unemployed (supporting hypothesis 2c) and retired people. The effect of income is negative, similarly indicating that the less privileged support these policies more strongly than the privileged, hence corroborating hypothesis 2d. We find, however, that people living in large towns support repatriation policies less than those living in rural areas which rejects hypothesis 2e. The effect of age is positive: older people support these policies more strongly. Gender differences do not reach significance.

In terms of contextual characteristics, we find that next to the proportion of migrants in the country, the effect of net migration also reaches significance. This finding implies that the more residents (already) reside in the country and the more migrants migrate to the country, the more native residents of these countries support repatriation policies. Other country characteristics do not reach significance. Yet, we find a weak relationship ($p < .10$) between GDP and support for repatriation policies, indicating that the worse the economic situation within a country, the higher the level of support for repatriation policies. The same results are retrieved when dropping the dummy for Eastern Europe. In this final model we also included the interaction term between education and

the unemployment level. We find, however, no evidence for such an interaction effect, refuting hypothesis 3b. In other words, the effect of education varies between East and West European societies, but does not so with the level of unemployment in a country.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

In this article we set out to answer the question, instigated by recent work of Mudde (2005) supposing that anti-immigrant sentiments would be more widely dispersed in Eastern European countries than in Western European countries. We found no empirical evidence for this supposition, on the contrary. In as far as there are differences between both regions, we found that the level of support for repatriation policies is more widely held in Western European countries. In previous research, similar patterns have already been ascertained (Coenders et al., 2005, 2007). Considering the national level determinants of this dimension of ethnic exclusionism as an answer to our second question, that is, the migrant stock and the net migration appear to induce support for repatriation policies, this may not come as a surprise. Many of these Eastern countries have not witnessed such strong immigrant flows into their countries, to the contrary: from many East European countries people (try to) migrate to West Europe where there are better job opportunities. However, there are signs that the East European countries – certainly now they have become members of the European Union – are becoming attractive migration options for citizens of the former Soviet Republics and Asian countries, which is expected to result in stronger exclusionist reactions in these countries too.

The East European countries vary strongly in their ethnic composition. Many of the countries have rather small recent migrant communities, except for Estonia and Latvia, due to the presence of Russians, but in some countries large minority groups are present which are not accounted for in official statistics, such as the Roma, or the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Turks in Bulgaria. The demographic differences and changes may be due to the actual policies that countries have adopted over time and may as such affect the public opinion in the countries (Castles, 1995). Yet, it would take additional cross-national over-time policy analyses to be able to include these as national level determinants in advanced analyses we envisage.

In terms of individual level determinants, we found that the level of education is a powerful determinant of this kind of ethnic exclusionism (see Vogt, 1997). Moreover, in this article we were able to provide rather firm evidence on the differential educational effects present in West versus East European societies, following up previous research (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Hello et al., 2002). The educational system is considered to be one of the dominant socializing agents transmitting the ‘official culture’ of an enlightened and respectful political ideology towards migrants and more generally minority rights. Weil (1985) argued that in non-democratic societies or in societies where the

democratic system had been interrupted, exposure to this kind of educational system would have less dominant effects for which hypothesis we provided the actual evidence in this article. In spite of the fact that many of these societies became democratic societies more than a decade ago, we are still able to trace such differential educational effects. It may, of course, take some time to wipe out these effects. We did not find evidence for the alternative-to-competition hypothesis from Kunovich (2004), expecting that education has less effect in societies with higher levels of unemployment. Other relevant determinants of support for repatriation policies could be summarized as a distinction between the more privileged versus the less privileged where the latter generally hold the rather exclusionist position. In terms of the Ethnic Group Conflict Theory, this support for repatriation policies is a rather rational reaction for the less privileged who may consider the presence of migrants to be a threat to their (claims on) scarce resources.

Appendix 1 Mean score and percentage support for repatriation policies for legal migrants

Country	Mean[a]	% support[b]	*N*
Finland	0.176	8.8	981
Sweden	0.143	7.8	971
Denmark	0.123	6.7	976
Great Britain	0.380	27.7	950
Northern Ireland	0.290	20.0	292
Ireland	0.410	29.5	923
Netherlands	0.315	19.9	968
Belgium	0.361	26.2	926
Luxembourg	0.347	15.4	448
Germany West	0.416	28.8	960
Germany East	0.432	32.6	939
Austria	0.437	29.0	944
France	0.388	22.9	1011
Spain	0.391	21.9	926
Portugal	0.437	23.7	959
Italy	0.391	19.1	970
Greece	0.507	31.5	974
West EU member states[c]	0.352	22.1	15,118
Estonia	0.340	17.3	618
Latvia	0.449	30.3	568
Lithuania	0.346	18.0	785
Poland	0.233	9.3	885
Czech Republic	0.272	14.7	909
Slovakia	0.256	13.1	856
Hungary	0.321	20.7	940
Slovenia	0.371	22.0	865
Malta	0.579	39.7	471
Cyprus	0.461	25.1	483
Romania	0.193	7.8	837
Bulgaria	0.270	11.0	767

(*continued*)

Appendix 1 (Continued)

Country	Mean[a]	% support[b]	*N*
Turkey	0.462	29.8	844
East European countries[c]	0.336	18.9	9828
East European countries[d]	0.335	19.0	9828

[a]Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.
[b]To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomized: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.
[c]To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively.
[d]To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Appendix 2 Contextual characteristics

Country	Unemployment rate in 2002[a]	GDP per capita in 2002[b]	Migrant stock in percentage of population in 2000[c]	Average annual net migration in, 1995–2000 per 1000 capita[d]	Average annual number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002, per 1000 capita[e]
Finland	9.1	24.79	2.6	0.8	0.49
Sweden	4.9	24.50	11.2	1.0	3.18
Denmark	4.5	27.48	5.7	2.7	1.73
Great Britain	5.1[f]	24.77[h]	6.8[k]	1.6	1.89
Northern Ireland	7.4[f]	19.20[h]	0.7[k]	1.6	1.89
Ireland	4.4	30.12	8.1	4.9	3.53
Netherlands	2.7	27.05	9.9	2.1	1.60
Belgium	7.3	25.97	8.6	1.3	2.28
Luxembourg	2.8	45.46	37.2	9.4	1.95
Germany West	6.5[g]	26.50[i]	10.4 l	2.8	1.09
Germany East	15.2[g]	16.45[i]	4.4 l	1.1	1.09
Austria	4.3	26.90	9.4	0.6	4.27
France	8.8	24.65	10.6	0.7	1.11
Spain	11.3	20.23	3.2	0.9	0.20
Portugal	5.1	16.49	2.3	1.3	0.02
Italy	9.0	24.55	2.8	2.0	0.15
Greece	10.0	15.82	5.0	3.3	0.53
Estonia	9.1	10.03	26.2	−8.0	0.01
Latvia	12.8	8.45	25.3	−2.0	0.01
Lithuania	13.1	9.38	9.2	0.0	0.07
Poland	19.9	9.46	5.4	−0.5	0.12
Czech Republic	7.3	14.38	2.3[m]	1.0	1.41
Slovakia	18.6	11.35	0.6[n]	0.3	1.65
Hungary	5.6	13.58	3.0	−0.7	0.80
Slovenia	6.0	17.71	2.6[m]	0.5	2.22
Malta	7.4	11.93[j]	2.2[m]	1.4	0.60

(*continued*)

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Country	Unemployment rate in 2002[a]	GDP per capita in 2002[b]	Migrant stock in percentage of population in 2000[c]	Average annual net migration in, 1995–2000 per 1000 capita[d]	Average annual number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002, per 1000 capita[e]
Cyprus	3.8	17.38	6.3	3.9	2.05
Romania	7.0	5.88	0.4	−0.5	0.08
Bulgaria	18.1	5.93	1.3[m]	−4.9	0.33
Turkey	10.4	5.50	2.3	−0.8	0.07

[a]Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. Source: Eurostat (2003a).
[b]GDP per capita in purchasing power standards. Source: Eurostat (2003b).
[c]The mid-year estimate of the number of people who are born outside the country. For countries that did not have data on place of birth but had data on citizenship, the estimated number of non-citizens is displayed. In both cases, migrant stock also includes refugees. Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).
[d]Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).
[e]Source: for asylum application figures: UNHCR (2002, 2003). Total population on 1 January 2001 and 2002 derived from Eurostat (2003c).
[f]Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2002).
[g]Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a).
[h]Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2003a).
[i]Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b).
[l]Eurostat did not report figures for Malta after 1999. From the National Statistics Office Malta GDP growth rates were taken and multiplied with the Eurostat 1999 figure.
[k]Data spring 1998. Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Office for National Statistics (2003).
[l]Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003c).
[m]Estimated mid-year number of non-citizens of the country with the addition of refugees.
[n]Imputed mid-year number of migrants with the addition of refugees.

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Marcel Coenders and **Marcel Lubbers** are Associate Professors in the Department of General Social Sciences of Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

Peer Scheepers is a Full Professor of Social Science Research Methodology of Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Address: Department of Social Science Research Methodology, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
[email: p.scheepers@maw.ru.nl]